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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY (IN THE (PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION) 
(INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION) OF THE STATE OF IDAHO) 














SUPREME COURT NO. 
Dist. Court No. CR-2015-4470-C 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Valley. 
Honorable Jason D. Scott, District Judge 
Presiding 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLATE 
Daniel W. Bower 
12550 W Explorer Dr. Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83713 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Valley County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0004470-C Current Judge: Jason Scott 
Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder 
User: CWHITE 
















Notice Of Appearance, Plea Of Not Guilty And Demand For Jury Trial Lamont C. Berecz 
Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder Appearance Gabriel M Haws Lamont C. Berecz 
A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (136-1603 FIG-Trespass on Cultivated Lamont C. Berecz 
Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries) 
New Case Filed - Misdemeanor Lamont C. Berecz 
Prosecutor assigned Valley County Prosecutor 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/15/2015 09:30 AM) Trespass to 
retrieve wild life 
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 12/15/2015 09:30 AM: 
Hearing Vacated Trespass to retrieve wildlife 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 02/08/2016 10:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
State's Notice of Response To Defendant's Request for Discovery Lamont C. Berecz 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 02/08/201610:00 AM: Lamont C. Berecz 
Hearing Held 
A Plea is entered for charge: -GT (136-1603 FIG-Trespass on Cultivated 
Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries) 
Defendant's Written Plea Of Guilty 
Order Setting Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 03/14/2016 02:20 PM) 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 03/14/2016 02:20 PM: 
Disposition With Hearing 
Court Accepts Guilty Plea 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 665.00 charge: 136-1603 FIG-Trespass on 
Cultivated Lands in Violation of Warning Signs, or Marked Boundaries 
Other Sentencing Option Imposed:: Other Hours assigned: O Terms: 
Update Hunter Education/Safety Class and Sent Proof To Court to be 
completed by 9/14/2016 
Supplemental Brief 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 05/17/2016 03:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Motion For An Order To Appear Telephonically 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For An Order To 
Appear Telephonically 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion To Appear Telephonically Lamont C. Berecz 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 05/10/2016 03:30 PM: Lamont C. Berecz 
Hearing Held Telephonic #204950 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Memorandum Decision 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
Lamont C. Berecz 
0003
Date: 1/4/2017 
Time: 09:33 AM 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Valley County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2015-0004470-C Current Judge: Jason Scott 
Defendant: Kerr, Brian Calder 
State of Idaho vs. Brian Calder Kerr 
Misdemeanor 
Date 
8/2/2016 Order Establishing Appellate Procedure 
9/2/2016 Appellant's Brief 
9/6/2016 Change Assigned Judge 
9/15/2016 Respondent's Brief 
10/5/2016 Appellant's Reply Brief 
10/18/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 11/21/2016 10:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
11/3/2016 Motion To Continue Oral Argument 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Conitnue Oral Argument 
11/21/2016 Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 11/21/2016 
10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 12/19/2016 03:00 PM) 
11/22/2016 Notice Of Hearing 
12/19/2016 Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal scheduled on 12/19/2016 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Opinion On Appeal 
1/4/2017 NOTICE OF APPEAL 




















IDAHO DEPT. Of S:ISH AND GAME 4 6 8 9 2, 
• I?, o" Box 25, Boise, r 707 C,R-2Q \5-( -l7 Q--C · 
IDAHO UNIFOAt\ CITATION .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE _)i,_._ ____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Vo-.l Vl.j · 
STATE OF IDAHO COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 
N VS. ~ D Infraction Citation 
a> \<e c c > . rvi oR 
~ e, r i l.\O Lasl :Natne Ca \de,.r ) ~ Miademeanor Citation 
First Name Mkldle Initial ) 
""" · · · .. , 8.3&\b 
Home Address 25 Jl 'w a.sf meadow &J,v. £111..1 le ' State, I I) 
Business Address - Ph # . 5 \;,\ ~ ·¼»t2 
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTFIES AND SAYS: 
I certify I have reasonable grounds, and believe the above-named Defendant, · .. 
dOr SS# State l C> D F 
Height "20(> Wt. J(aO Hair \'HO Eyes klAl DOB
Veh.Lic.# .,. State· ___ Yr.ofVehicte ___ Make _____ _ 
Model-------,---- Color ____ __,----,,--
Did commit the follbwing act(s) on oc.:t. ,..,..- , -~at \ l ~ CIO o'clock _6:::_ M. 
Vio. #1 Tcest.i:pa.s~ . to ~e:\tleve w\\cl\i§'.e. (k0 phLeeeD,-
bu\l eUc) 0 ';' C u\ttvo..\ed \o..n d <..o,,.\,~ \dg\ \:y . 
i rr'r,yi~ed pa.stuce) wiJborJ: 'P~rmt'2b\OQ fmr,, '' 
Vie. *2 I Mc\~l,la9.r_ ~4 fC ~/J4t.J)-\'3)3cf.~~ 
Location Bi/ ho.r:.. RctAC:~ 
Unit "Z.. ':I PC~ '$ I 
11>:10-1,;, ~4ifJIJIIHII 
Dik .23 .. , ! . 11;/.h{:;!f.:J. ..... 
Date · Witnessing Officer 
---z._,,·.,.~----·-~-·· .... I ·_I_~..,.--· _·. _·. __ co~ty, Idaho. 
Serial .#/Address 
···:,;3)1 




Defendant's Signature DEC Q 9 2015' 
I hereby certify service upon the defen t personally on ________ , 19 __ 
Case No, ____ lnst. No.. __ _ 
Officer Fited ___ A.M I: 2;?) P-M. 
NOTICE: See reverse side of ~ur copy for PENAL TY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATluN #1 
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Log of lV-COURTROOMl 0¥8/2016 
Description KERR, BRIAN CALDER CR-2015-4470-C 
JUDGE LAMONT C BERECZ 
PROSECUTOR: VALLEY COUNTY 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: GABRIEL M. HAWS 
CLERK: C. WHITE 
BAILIFF: J. REDMON 
Date 2/8/2016 Location 1V-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
10:59:57 AM Judge. Calls case. 
11:00:13 AM Judge Believe I gave the signed plea agreement back. 
11:00:22 AM Defense 
Counsel Yes, approach 
Yes. 
Page 1 of2 
11 :00: udge fore the court on PTC for trespass to retrieve wildlife. 
11:00:56 AM Defense 
Counsel 
11:01:13 AM Defense 
Counsel 
11:01:20 AM Judge 
Pleading to 36-1603 A 
Please interlineate with 16 
Understand pleading GT to this charge. Understand the 
agreement? 
Yes 
Are you under the influence of any alcohol or drugs? 
hreat or force to enter GT plea? 
Enough time with your attorney? 
Advises defendant of rights. Understand? 
11 :02:21 AM Judge 
· 11 :02:22 AM I plead GT. I went onto cultivated land to retrieve an elk that I 
Defendant shot on public land lawfully. I did not ask the owners of the land 
for permission to go onto property. 
file:///R:/Lognotes-HTML/Berecz/2016/2016%20February/02-08-2016/KERR,%20BRIAN... 2/8/2016 
0006
Log of lV-COURTROOMl on.8/2016 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
Page2 of2 
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IN THE DISTIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICI! Dl)--
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF,-~~~:.w:,,.--..-
THE STA TE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. CR-2015-4470-C 
FEB O 8 2016 
case j [ 111St. No. 








DEFENDANT'S WRITTEN GUILTY PLEA 






D Defendant Representing Self or 
~Defendant Represented by Attorney 
I, Brian C. Kerr, the above-named defendant, desire to plead guilty as set forth below, to the charge(s) in this case, I am 
~ years of age and have had .k!/_ years of education. I am not under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or other mind-
affecting substances at this time. I am fully aware of the present proceedings and of their legal significance. I have decided to plead 
guilty (check one of the following): 
D after careful consideration on my own, or 
IZI after discussion of this matter with my attorney, Gabriel M. Haws. 
No one has made any promises, threats, or other inducements to get me to plead guilty in this action. IfI am on probation or parole, 
this guilty plea may be used against me as the basis for a probation or parole violation. 
I understand that the judge is not bound by any plea agreement between the state and me, and the maximum punishment allowed 
under state law has been explained to me. I am aware that the Court may impose conditions of probation in my sentencing. The only 
agreement that has been made in this case is as follows: 
Defendant pleads guilty to tresspass to retrieve wildlife, a violation ofldaho Code section 36-1603(a) in 
exchange for state capp. ing its sentencing recommendatio-~ year unsupervised probation, 30 days of 
jail with 30 suspended, $500 fine plus cow:t costs, $750 c · tmd processing pettttlty, one (1) year 
hunting and fishing license suspension, and-tislumd_game will confiscat~ih~ bull elk; State will dismiss charges 
against co-defendants Garrett B Kerr and Jeffrey J. Peterson; Defendnat is free to argue for less; Defendant 
requests the court vacate the pre-trial conference date and set this case for sentencing hearing. 
In entering this guilty plea, I am fully aware that I am waiving any defenses I may have to these charges. Additionally, I may be E. ed to submit an evaluation{s) for sentencing and I am waiving certain important rights such as: ~o be represented by an attorney, and have one appointed if I cannot afford one .. 
,'( IZ! To require the state to prove every element of my charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IZ! To enter a plea in open court before a judge. 
IZI To appeal this conviction, although the sentence may be appealed. 
IZI To have a jury trial or court trial. 
IZI To not be compelled to testify against myself. 
D To personally address the court prior to sentencing. 
IZ! To confront witnesses against me and subpoena my own witnesses. 
THEREFORE, I hereby authorize entry of a guilty plea on my behalf and authorize my attorney (if applicable) to enter a guilty plea in 
the above-captioned action, pursuant to M.C.R. 6(d) and State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 P. 56 l, 208 P. 871 (1921 ). This plea is 
given knowingly. intelligently. and voluntarily. 
DATED thi5 5th ........ day of l·ehruary, 2015. 
~ ... 17</·.,;,.; -
(' /'J\.__ ~
Defendant 





Log of 1 V-COURTROOMl w/14/2016 - Page 1 of 4 
Description KERR, BRIAN CALDER CR-2015-4470-C 
JUDGE: LAMONT C. BERECZ 
PROSECUTOR: VALLEY COUNTY 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: GABRIEL M HAWS 
CLERK: J. HON 
BAILIFF: C. WHITE 
Date 3/14/2016 Location II 1V-COURTROOM1 
Time Speaker Note 
02:37:20 PM Judge Calls case 
02:37:25 PM State Recess for 5 minutes to speak to Fish and Game? 
02:37:36 PM Recess 
02:41:47 PM Judge Recalls case 
02:41:57 PM 
Judge Present with counsel; having plead GT; Plea agreement for the 
record, free to argue for less 
02:42:42 PM Judge I will hear from the state 
02:42:51 PM Review of case for the record. That property did not allow people 
State to hunt, actually shot the Elk on Public Property and died on 
Private property. May I show exhibits? 
02:44:1~r~-r-· ..:_nt I object; charge with trespass not unlawful taking 
02· •• ". -- • ~"" -~~-V'T I IYI 1- I will over rule; something that I can consider 
02:44:52 PM Photo of heart, lungs, and trees on property. Further statement 
for the record. I have a F & G Officer Rowley here in the 
State courtroom for a statement. No prior record, further agreement 




So let me understand .... suggesting that he did not shoot the elk 
on private property? 
02:47:42 PM 
State 
Further comments for the court. F & G wants 1 year license 
suspension and keep the elk. Wanting to call Officer Rowley 
02:48:56 PM Officer <SWORN> 
Rowley 
02:49:09 PM 
States name for the record; work experience; 2nd officer on this; 
showed up right before Mr Kerr was leaving; Fellow officer 
Officer explained to me what had happened; animal had ran and where 
Rowley they were processing it. Look for evidence; blood, track; I have 
found none; no tracks that the animal had been running; Mr. Kerr 
had access from the high water mark; went west and walked a 
good distance; moist and mudding, no boot prints; small creek 
file:// /R:/Lognotes-HTML/Berecz/2016/2016%20March/03-14-2016/KERR, %20BRIAN%... 3/14/2016 
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coming at an angle; followed that; no prints along the creek; 
returned to elk; cut out vital organs; took photos at that point 
found no blood track; getting dark. returned the next morning, 
looked for any sign for where the elk had ran; blood spot was 1 /4 
mile from property. The entire property was fenced; flood irrigated 
with cows 
Mr Haws? 
Review of Photo of the Elk's heart, I don't have that particular 
information; yes, After Officer Hunter arrived, yes, yes, I did not 
fine the bullet; Officer Hunter said it was a pass thru; no; there 
was nothing to stop it; we did not, we did not, He was not charged 
with that, I am not aware; I was the secondary officer on this 
case, when I arrived, they were at that spot; distance for the first 





Presents exhibit to the court and explains the location of the 
animal. The property is not marked; there is a fence; flood 
irrigation, there is approximately 1 mile that is public land. Further 
statements for the court on the Defendant. Evidence shows that 
this animal was lawfully taken. Prove a negative. Appropriate 
sentence and puts on the record. Further Review of the case for 
the record. Irrigated and cultivated 
So he thought he could? 
Continued statements about the retrieving the meat and 
harvesting it. Could have been mistaken about the law. 30 Hours 
of Community Service; no license restriction and explains for the 
36-202 code for the record. No unlawful taking in this case. 36-
1404 B reviewed for the court and read into the record. Evidence 
to show it was not unlawful taking. Asking for an Order that the 
animal be released to Mr. Kerr. 36-1402 E reviews for the record 
and reads into the record. Corrected Sub-section D. 
You might be looking at an old ... look at your pocket supplement. 
Continued statements for the court on the code. 
larification of license suspension 
Continued Statements 
file:// /R:/Lognotes-HTML/Berecz/2016/2016%20March/03-14-2016/KERR, %20BRIAN%... 3/14/2016 
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Log of IV-COURTROOM! w/14/2016 - Page 3 of 4 
Counsel 
03:11:09 PM State Final comment 
03:11 :16 PM Judge If it is brief 
03:11:26 PM 
State Further comments for the court; the landowner is still not allowing 
the taking of the animal. 
03:12:22 PM h1rlae Response? 
03:12:28 PM Defense 
Continued comments. Counsel 
03:13:15 PM Judge Mr. Kerr, anything you want to say before sentence? 
03:13:34 PM Statement for the court. Hunting history for the court. Tracking 
experience and further information for the court. Did take him on 
Defendant public land. Officers were out to get us from the beginning. I have 
learned from the process. Doing our best to harvest and 
appreciate your consideration. 
03:17:28 PM Judg~ nk you. 
03:17:55 PM Certainly an interesting case; I don't know that.. ... I am not going 
to agree that the only evidence was taking lawfully. I have not 
hear the case. The state has presented the evidence that you 
took the elk on private property. Continued comments to the 
Defendant, very different offense. Bottom line I cannot say that 
Judge 
you did or you didn't. For purpose of sentencing I have to 
sentence you on what you plead guilty to. In terms of forfeiting 
the elk; you ought to loss that; taking lawfully is not defined in the 
statue, shooting and retrieving it; went onto private land to take it 
and you trespassed; even if I accept it was taken on public land. I 
find that it is appropriate; forfeiter the meat and antlers to fish and 
game; give free to others. 
03:23:39 PM Defense 
Short motion to reconsider? 
Counsel 
03:23:55 PM Judge 11Yes 
03:23:59 PM Defense Taking and explanation for the court. Retrieve is not included. 
Counsel Asking to reconsider; excluded from the code 
03:24:45 p~. ,... ' I ,..,..., ,..,.._,•thing? - 'J - ., ·- • 
03:24:49 PM Judge yes 
03:24:52 PM State It's the issue of possession 
03:25:01 PM Defense Unlawful possession; was not charged with that? 
Counsel 
03:25:28 PM State Clarification for the court of the code 
03:25:4: -~.- Judge Take and the meaning from the code; unlawful taking clarification. 
03:26:13 PM 
Reconsideration; unlawfully in possession of Mr Kerr; so while .... 
I 
file:// /R:/Lognotes-HTML/Berecz/2016/2016%20March/03-14-2016/KERR, %20BRIAN%... 3/14/2016 
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Log of IV-COURTROOMI w/14/2016 - Page4 of4 
Judge 
03:27:44 P 






36-202 Taking unlawfully. I am concerned that is going to look 
like I am going to split the baby; and further clarification for the 
record. 
I am not going to suspend you license 
there is an argument on both sides. I am going to impose 
$500.00 fine, cc $165. for total of$ 
I am going to require you to complete an updated hunting class 
and send to court within 6 months in lieu of license suspension. 
Understand? 
sign the order for Forfeiture 
I am wanting to back to the Forfeiture; maybe legal briefing, I 
would like 6 weeks to file that motion before you sign that Order. 
uld give you 45; let's say 30 days to do that. 
r Rowley, imperative that something was wrong. 
Motion to reconsider, I will give the 30 days 
Adjourned 







- 9 .D( IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT VA'rly, ,~'; FQK ,·I,.,:; I I, 
_2GIUDGMENT _PROBATION ORDER _WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
STAtE OF IDAHO vs. 
),aputy 
BRIAN CALDER KERR 
SS# ###-##-
case No. ____ 1nst. ~-
Flleu.d ___ ___.A.M. S;OU P.M. 
DEFENDANT having been charged with: 
Count 1: Tres ass to retrieve wildlife 136-1603 
Count 2: ____________________________________ _ 
Count 3: ____________________________________ _ 
DEFENDANT having been advised of all rights & penalties per ICR 5, 11, IMCR 5(f) CASE# CR-2015-0004470-C 
DEFENDANT WAS "g]Present O Not Present 
~as represEfuted by: 
~efendant Waived: }zrRight Against Self-Incrimination ~Jury Trial 
Right To: ~Confront & Cross Examination .D Counsel Ji! All Defenses 
COURT ENTERS JUDGMENT AFTER: ~oluntary Guilty Plea O Trial: Found Guilty 
0 WITHHELD JUDGMENT - bpires: ____ -____ _ 
0 ORDERED: DEFENDANT'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED __ days beginning ______ .: and/or 
D INTERLOCK Dates: ____________ OWith Restricted License D Absolute Suspension 
0 DEFENDANT IS ORDER~D TO PAY TO THE CLERK:Time to pay~dayOPay within monthsO /mo th be in on 
Count 1: Fine/Penalty !f <13.p!li ~w/$ ~ Suspended+ CT.COSTS$ ~ = $ Total--t6-'IH-=t---
Count 2: Fine/Penalty$_____ w/$ ______ Suspended+ CT.COSTS$___ =$Total ____ _ 
Count 3: Fine/Penalty$_____ w/$ ______ Suspended+ CT.COSTS$___ =$Total ____ _ 
Community Public Probation Prosecution 
Service Ins.$ ___ Defender$____ Fees$ __ Restitution$___ Costs$___ * Total $ _____ _ 
Ii] All cash bonds will be applied to the fines/court costs/restitution owed and any balance remaining will be returned. 
**PAY TO: Valley County, PO Box 1350, Cascade, ID 83611 - PH. 208-382-7178 - Fax 208-382-7184 (include Case 
No.)** 
0 DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO BE INCARCERATED FOR: 
Count 1: ______ daysW/ ______ Suspended - Credit. _______ =Total ______ _ 
Count 2: ______ days W/______ Suspended - Credit. _______ = Total ______ _ 
Count 3: ______ days W/______ Suspended - Credit. _______ = Total ______ _ 
D ___ Days to be served at the discretion of the Probation Officer. D __ hours community service in lieu of jail 
0 PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Probation Expires: ______ (_Supervised) (_Unsupervised) 
D Enroll/ complete treatment program(s) marked on Judgment Supplement. 
D Report to Probation Officer at 550 Deinhard Lane, McCall, ID - 634-4131, within 5 days, sign and comply with 
standard probation agreement. Probation Officer:) 
Iii No alcohol or controlled substance in bodily system on reporting to jail or during service of jail. 
D R_efuse no evidentiary test for drugs or alcohol with or without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 
Iii Commit no crime Iii Pay all Fines, Costs, Restitution, and Reimbursements. iJNotify Court of any address change. 
D Defendant accepted terms and conditions of probation and received copy of this form and Judgment Supplement (if 
applicable). 
D File proof of completion of hours of Community Service for Non-Profit or Government agency by ____ _ 
D File substance abuse / alcohol evaluation. wit~ Cou by 
~ ~;W1 ~ns f}~af/f,)£ r:;7,t,r 
-~ther 
Date of Judgment/Order: \ 
---,l'-1-~~,--~~7 
cc: :::6.Defendant }{_ P.A. b. P 
00013
0510212016 14:04 
Gabriel M. Haws, ISB # 6999 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83 713 
Telephone: (208) 345-3333 
Fax No.: (208) 345-4461 
ghaws@stm-law.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
P.0021009 
'"'-"'-1Jil'.ll.A MILLER, CLERK 
BY·---.1~~""------Deputy 
MAY O 2 2016 
Case No, ___ ln;)~· 
Filed AM._,/ 7 P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COUR1" OF THE FOURTI·I JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO APPEAR 
TELEPHONICALLY 
COMES NOW, above-named Defendant, by and though counsel of record, Stewart 
Taylor & Morris PLLC. pursuant to Rule 7(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
moves this Court for an order permitting counsel for the Defendant to appear telephonically for 
hearing scheduled for Tuesday, May 10, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. An Affidavit of Counsel setting 
forth the basis for this Motion is filed contemporaneously herewith, 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO APPEAR TELEPI-IONICALL Y - 1 
00014
05/02/2016 14:05 • P.003/009 
~ 
DATED this $ day of May, 2016. 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MOTION FOR AN ORDER TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y - 2 
00015
• -~OUG~~AJIULLER, CLERK 
Y :!L~\ "-Deputy 
MAY O 9 2016 
Case No. ____ lnsi. l\!(),, .• _,.. __ 
Filed A.M. _,,-j ~ 3p, P.M. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BRIAN C. KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO APPEAR 
TELEPHONICALL Y 
This matter having come before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for an Order to 
Appear Telephonically ("Defendant's Motion"), and the Court having reviewed Defendant's 
Motion and accompanying Affidavit of Counsel in support of the same, and good cause 
appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and that on Tuesday, 
May 10, 2016, at 3:30 p.m. Defendant'sJcounsel shall call the Court at the following phone 
B {!__o e ¥ ~ot/960 
nwnber ao-222· ffi:!<> , for the hearing scheduled herein. 
DATED this~ day of May, 2016. 
Lamont . Berecz 
Magistrate Judge 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y - 1 
00016
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~day of May, 2016, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Valley County Prosecutor's Office 
219 N. Main St. 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Gabriel M. Haws 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100 












Facsimile: (208) 345-4461 
Email: 
By: Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALL Y • 2 
00017
- -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ£ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OW11.M1~ 
8Y.-~~::;.u_...:::::_ __ Oeputy 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




CASE NO. CR-lltl's-2f47()-C A.M ;··~,a;-P.-.M. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Brian Kerr was cited on October 15, 2015, by Fish and Game Officers for the charge of 
''Trespass to retrieve wildlife (trophy bull elk) on cultivated land (artificially irrigated pasture) 
without permission from the landowner" a violation of Idaho Code § 36-1603(a). On February 
8, 2016, Kerr pied guilty to the offense as charged. 
This trespassing offense is a misdemeanor under the Fish and Game statutes. As such, it 
carries with it a possible fine of between $25 to $1,000 and a jail sentence of up to 6 months. 
See I.C. § 36-1402(b). Additionally, Kerr faced a possible suspension of his hunting (or fishing 
or trapping) privileges for up to 3 years. 
At sentencing, on March 14, 2016, per the parties' settlement agreement, the State argued 
that the bull elk which Kerr shot should be confiscated to Fish and Game pursuant to LC. § 36-
l 304(b ). Kerr argued that he ought to be able to keep the elk despite his trespass and that I.C. § 
36- l 304(b) was inapplicable to his case'. 
The Court ultimately imposed a fine, a requirement for a hunter safety class, and ordered 
the elk to be forfeited to the Department of Fish of Game. Kerr asked for reconsideration of the 
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page 1 
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forfeiture (technically a confiscation) and permission to brief the issue. The Court granted Kerr 
time to brief the issue. The State did not respond to Kerr's briefing. On May 10, 2016, the Court 
considered again the issue of the elk's confiscation and took the matter under advisement. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There is no question that Kerr trespassed onto another person's property, which was 
cultivated land, in order to retrieve a bull elk that had been shot. Those facts are not in dispute 
because that is what Kerr was charged with and to which he pled guilty. 
At sentencing, the State presented the testimony of a Fish and Game officer, as well as 
photographic exhibits, which tended to prove that Kerr shot the elk on the same private property 
that he trespassed upon. Kerr did not testify at the sentencing hearing but his counsel argued 
Kerr's account- that account being that Kerr shot the elk while on public land and that the elk 
then ran onto the private property where it expired before Kerr retrieved it. Counsel for Kerr 
argued that a witness' account of hearing the gunshot would substantiate Kerr's account. 
This factual dispute was not resolved by the Court as it was not necessary to Kerr's plea 
of guilty to the charge. Nevertheless, Kerr wants the Court to accept that he lawfully shot the elk 
before trespassing. Kerr argues that because the State did not charge him with illegally taking 
the elk under LC.§ 36-1404 and did not request a processing fee under LC.§ 36-1404 that the 
State tacitly agrees that he took the elk lawfully. That is, Kerr urges this Court to make a finding 
that Kerr "lawfully took" the elk based on the prosecutor's charging decisions. At the hearing on 
reconsideration, the prosecutor argued that he had the evidence to charge Kerr with illegally 
taking the elk but exercised his discretion to prosecute the trespass in order to resolve the case. 
Divining the underlying facts of a case from a prosecutor's exercise of their discretion is 
an undertaking fraught with speculation. To the extent Kerr asks this Court to accept his version 
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 2 
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that he shot the elk lawfully, this Court declines to make that factual finding. Likewise, to the 
extent the State asks this Court to look at the evidence presented at sentencing and make a 
factual finding that he shot the elk while in the act of trespassing, this Court declines to make 
that factual finding. 
What the Court finds factually is that Kerr shot a bull elk which died on someone's 
private property. Kerr trespassed onto that property to retrieve the elk. The issue thus becomes: 
does I.C. § 36-1304(b) apply to these facts? I.C. § 36-1304(b) reads: 
(b) Unlawfully Taken Wildlife--Seizure, Confiscation, Disposition. 
(i) The director or any other officer empowered to enforce the fish and game laws 
may at any time seize and take into his custody any wildlife or any portion thereof 
which may have been taken unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the 
possession of any person. If it appears from the evidence before the magistrate 
hearing the case that said wildlife was unlawfully taken, the magistrate shall: 
1. Order the same confiscated or sold by the director and the proceeds 
deposited in the fish and game account; or 
2. In his discretion, order such confiscated wildlife given to a designated 
tax-supported, nonprofit or charitable institution or indigent person. 
According to the statute, if the elk was unlawfully taken by Kerr then it is subject to confiscation. 
Statutory construction dictates that the Court look to the terms "unlawfully" and "taken." 
As stated by our Idaho Supreme Court: 
The word .. unlawful" has been defined as "[t]hat which is contrary to, prohibited, 
or unauthorized by law. That which is not lawful. The acting contrary to, or in 
defiance of the law; disobeying or disregarding the law. Term is equivalent to 
without excuse or justification." black's Law Dictionary 1536 (6th ed.1990). 
State v. Leferink,.133 Idaho 780, 783 (1999). Under this definition, Kerr's actions in trespassing 
were unlawful. That is, his act of trespassing to retrieve the elk was in defiance of the law or, in 
slightly gentler terms, contrary to or prohibited by the law. 
The next question is whether Kerr's action of trespassing to retrieve the elk fits the 
definition that he had "taken" the elk. "Take" is defined in J.C. § 36-202(i): "'Take' means 
hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot. fish, seine, trap, kill, or possess or any attempt to so do." 
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 3 
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Given the expansive definition of take, 1 there are a variety of ways in which Kerr may have 
taken the elk. But specific to the issue at hand, the Court finds that Kerr's action in trespassing 
was for the sole purpose of possessing an elk that he had shot. Or put another way, Kerr 
trespassed (went onto someone else's property unlawfully) in order to possess (take) an elk. 
Therefore, the elk was "unlawfully taken" by Kerr while he was actively trespassing. 
Kerr argues that his taking or possession of the elk was lawful and that he was entitled to 
possess the elk. 2 Kerr's argument is to parse his actions into a separate taking that was 
accomplished prior to his trespass. The Court is not persuaded that Kerr's "taking" of the elk 
was a separate, earlier completed act, unrelated to the taking that occurred while trespassing. It 
was in the very act of trespassing that Kerr was able to accomplish the taking - that is, except for 
his trespass Kerr never possessed the elk. Under the broad definition of "take" it is also true that 
Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed the elk. The fact that he took the elk by shooting it 
(perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to diminish or wash 
away the taint of the taking Kerr engaged in when he trespassed to possess the elk. 
1 The term "hunt" is further and more expansively defined in 36-202(j): 
"Hunting" means chasing, driving, flushing, attracting, pursuing, worrying, 
following after or on the trail of, shooting at, stalking, or lying in wait for, any 
wildlife whether or not such wildlife is then or subsequently captured, killed, 
taken, or wounded. Such term does not include stalking, attracting, searching for, 
or lying in wait for, any wildlife by an unarmed person solely for the purpose of 
watching wildlife or taking pictures thereof. 
2 Kerr makes an interesting analogy to a person possessing a ball that is kicked onto a neighbor's 
property. To borrow that analogy, the Court sees this case more like a parent allowing a child to 
have a ball so long as he follows the rules. When the child throws the ball into a neighbor's 
flower garden and walks through the flowers to retrieve the ball, the parent is well within their 
rights to confiscate the ball from the child for disobedience. 
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Kerr also argues that there are separate crimes related to "illegal taking" and "illegal 
possessing" with which he was not charged or convicted. Kerr points out that there are 
statutorily more stringent penalties associated with these crimes that are not in the trespassing 
section. Kerr then reasons that LC.§ 36-1304(b) was only intended to apply to convictions of 
specific crimes of "illegal taking" or "illegal possession." Kerr also argues that because the 
Legislature did not detail the application of the confiscation statute to the trespassing statute that 
the Legislature did not intend for it to apply. 
Contrary to Kerr's narrow reading, I.C. § 36-1304(b) is not tied to or limited to 
convictions of particular offenses. By its plain language, LC. § 36-1304(b) is a statute of broad 
applicability across the spectrum of Fish and Game cases. It is a statute unrelated to penalties -
rather, it provides the authority for the Department of Fish and Game to dispose of wildlife. 
Presumably, the rationale is that those who violate the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc. 
ought not to profit from or get to keep the fruits of their illegal activity. 
Kerr's other argument that the Legislature did not specifically detail the application of 
LC. § 36-1304(b) helps make the point. The Legislature did not detail the application of I.C. § 
36-1304(b) to any particular section of the code. That is, of course, because it is generally 
applicable whenever unlawfully taken wildlife is involved. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Kerr could not possess this elk without committing the illegal act of 
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Department of Fish and Game. and Kerr· s request to reconsider is denied. 
DATED this 3/~ day of May, 2016. 
Kerr - Memorandum Decision, Page - 6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, THE VALLEY COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54, the defendant, 
Brian C. Kerr, hereby appeals to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Valley from the Memorandum Decision. entered in the above-
entitled action on May 31, 2016, Honorable Lamont C. Berecz presiding. 
(a) This appeal is taken upon matters of law. 
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(b) Testimony and proceedings at the sentencing hearing were recorded. The person 
responsible and/or in possession of the recording or reporting of that sentencing hearing is the 
Magistrate Court Clerk. 
( c) The issues on appeal are as follows: 
1) Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and 
§ 36-202(i) where there was a finding that the Defendant harvested and 
took game illegally prior to the trespass and no finding that the taking was 
unlawful prior to the"trespass? 
2) Are Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) and § 36-1304(b) unconstitutionally vague 
and unenforceable as to the Defendant? 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2016. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
e . o r 
brie] M. Haws 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I hereby certify that on this 1 ih day of July, 2016, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Valley County Prosecutor's Office 
219 N. Main St. 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, ID 83611 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile: (208) 382-7124 
Email: 
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Case No ___ ,nst. No, ___ _ 
Filed AM f 3/ P.M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C 
ORDER ESTABLISHING 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Having reviewed the Notice of Appeal filed by Defendant-Appellant Brian Kerr on July 
12, 2016, the Court determines under I.C.R. 54.6(c) that this appeal involves only a question of 
law, so no transcript is needed and the appeal will be decided on the clerk's record, the parties' 
briefs, and oral argument. The question to be decided is whether, under LC.§ 36-1304(b), an elk 
was "taken unlawfully" by the defendant or was "unlawfully in the [defendant's] possession" 
where the defendant lawfully shot the elk while it was on private land, but before dying the elk 
moved onto private land, upon which the defendant unlawfully trespassed to retrieve it. 1 
1 Kerr's notice of appeal also asks the Court to decide whether section 36-1304(b) is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. The Court is not aware of that issue having been 
presented to Magistrate Judge Berecz. As such, it has not been preserved for appellate review. 
Consequently, the Court does not intend to solicit briefing on it. That said, if Kerr contends he 
raised the issue before Judge Berecz, or that the issue for some reason may be raised for the first 
time on appeal, he may seek reconsideration of this order. 
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Kerr's opening brief on appeal is due on September 2, 2016. Plaintiff-Respondent State 
of Idaho's response brief then comes due within the timeframe for which I.A.R. 34(c) provides. 
Kerr's reply brief, if any, likewise comes due within the timeframe for which that rule provides. 
The Court will set the matter for oral argument promptly after the briefing is complete. 
If either party contends some other appellate procedure would be more appropriate, that 
party may file a motion to modify this order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 7-.,J._ day of August 2016. 
J D. Scott 
D~TJUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,;;4 day of August 2016, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to: 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Daniel W. Bower 
Gabriel M. Haws 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
12550 W Explorer Dr, Ste 100 
Boise, ID 83713 
DOUGLAS MILLER 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN C. KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-0004470-C 
MOTION TO CONTINUE ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
COMES NOW. above-named Defendant, by and though counsel of record. Stewart 
Taylor & Mon-is PLLC, and moves this Court for an order continuing Oral Argument currently 
scheduled on November 21, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. An Affidavit of Counsel setting forth the basis 
for this Motion is filed conj'Fporaneously herewith. 
DATED thls~y of November, 2016. 
STEWART TAYLOR & MORRIS PLLC 
MOTIONTOCONTINUEORALARGUMENT-1 
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Valley County Prosecutor's Office 
219 N. Main St. 
P.O. Box 1350 
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I am Mr. Bauer, with the same law firm, on behalf of Mr. Kerr. 
I have read the parties briefs file in support of and opposition of 
this appeal. I suppose a critical issue is the appellants position 
lays on the idea that the elk was taken when it was shot and the 
shot occurred on lawful hunting grounds. The argument then 
goes on, since the shooting amounted to a lawful taking, that 
establishes the taking was lawful regardless of other aspects 
that were unlawful. Gist is how the statute defining take and 
justifies 
Argument for the record. Two things. Memorandum statement. 
Think the issue was addressed. 
Reading a lot into that. Magistrate did not mention void for 
vagueness. • 
Concede it does not. Think we can make a good argument there · 
is a problem. Second argument is more broad. Court noted our 
argument. 2nd paragraph on page 4. Argument was that 
pursuant to the statute there was two takings. 
nt things. 
Continued argument. Court recognized this is a broad definition 
and it is too broad. Those are the two arguments we assert. 
Pointing to things you are trying to infer about the magistrates 
decision. Haven't pointed me to anything you filed or made to try 
and substantiate you did raise the argument. 
I would respectfully disagree. His decision references our 
argument. 
Constitutes fundamental error. Issue at sentencing. 
Can you wait until your reply brief on appeal when inferring 
file://lv-serverl/ftr/Lognotes-HTML/Scott/2016/2016%20December/12-19-2016/KERR,... 12/19/2016 
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Log of lV-CRTl on 12/19/201. - Page 2 of 3 
fundamental error. 
03:00:57 PM 
Judge This is the same, could you 
wait until your reply brief to argue 
fundamental error. 
03:01:15 PM Will let the state argue that, but think the case law addresses 
Defense that. You don't have to raise it on appeal. Magistrate did 
Counsel recognize the issue. Fundamental error. Would like to address 
the substance to the constitutional error. Will make my argument 
shorter. 
03:02:58 PM Defense Subsequent argument is that the 4th amendment be worded 
Counsel with sufficient clarity. 
03:04:51 PM Legislature can say whatever they want to say. The problem is it 
gives an expansive definition. This gets to the nub of the issue. 
Defense 
The vague or misinterpretation. If the charge is taken away and I 
Counsel am left with the trespassing, am I still bound to the other statute. 
Magistrate Judge specifically states ... Kerr did a taking when he 
shot and killed the elk. I do not envy your or an appellate judge. 
Magistrate Judge recognized that issue and didn't want to deal. 
03:07:57 PM Isn't the upshot that if he does anything illegal he is subject to 
Judge forfeiture. He can do things lawfully, but if anything else that is 
done is unlawful, then he forfeits it. I don't think it's that deep. 
03:08:57 PM Defense Would agree. We're supposed to be great word smiths. A 
Counsel person of ordinary intelligence 
03:09:32 PM Does it matter to your argument and void for vagueness, you're 
Judge challenging what a separate provision of the statutory scheme 
makes this 
03:10:09 PM Defense 
I think that's the purpose of as applied challenge. Counsel 
03:10:19 PM 
Judge So not challenging the conviction? Conviction of violating one 
statute. 
03:10:42 PM I appreciate what you are saying and think it's important for the 
Defense constitutionality of it. Interesting case law, didn't site in my brief. 
Counsel US Bums v. United States. Talks about the failure to give notice 
to address higher charges. Due process. Triggers our argument. 
03:13:17 PM 
Judge You think your client should 
be able to keep while in the process 
of breaking the law to get it? 
03:13:35 PM Defense The statute says unlawful taking, if I took it lawfully, can I be 
Counsel held responsible? 
03:14:01 PM 
Judge 
If we assume he took it lawfully, shooting is a definite taking, it 
moves to what he did next, which was trespassing. 
03:14:29 PM 
Judge 
Don't know the answer to that. One option would have been to 
contact the home owner. 
03:14:44 PM 
Continued argument. I think the prosecutor and defense counsel I 
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Defense 
Counsel 
03:16:00 PM Defense 
Counsel 








03:22:20 PM Judge 
n~·??:21 P~ 
should have had more discussion. It's so hard, I don't think 
enough care and attention was provided during that stage with 
what everyone expected and how it played out. Think my guy 
had the expectation he would be allowed to keep the elk. 
Based on what an ordinary person would think upon reading the 
!.tatute. 
Considering how much time I have had to spend on this case, I 
wish I hadn't have made a deal. It bares to mention that two 
family members had charges that were dropped in this 
agreement. In the sentencing he did not testify. The only 
testimony was by fish and game. At the end of the day, wildlife 
belongs to the state of Idaho and to it's people. It could be a 
good tool here. If I shoot an elk and wound it and it runs away. 
Continued argument. I would have taken it under the statute. It 
would be an absurd thing to do, it goes without saying. These 
statutes are practical in a way. The Elk belongs to fish and 
game. They unlawfully retrieved an elk on private property and 
they don't get to keep it. 
I am confused, we are not asserting it belongs to us. I think, 
what the prosecutor mentions highlights some of the confusion 
here. Legislature could have been more clear on this. I think all 
of these other circumstances highlight the magistrates 
frustration. 
Decision will be under advisement and will be delivered 
promptly. 
Adjourned 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www. fortherecord. com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN CALDER KERR, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2015-04470-C 
OPINION ON APPEAL 
Brian Kerr appeals the magistrate's decision that an elk he shot, ostensibly on public 
land, is subject to confiscation by the Idaho Department of Fish and Grune because, to retrieve it, 
he trespassed on cultivated private land, where the elk died. Kerr contends the magistrate 
misapplied the confiscation statute, LC. § 36-1304(b)(i). Alternatively, he says the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. But, as explained below, it unrunbiguously provides 
for the result the magistrate reached. The magistrate's decision therefore is affirmed. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 15, 2015, Kerr shot an elk in Valley County. According to him, both he and 
the elk were on a public hunting ground when he shot it. The State ofldaho disagrees. In any 
event, Kerr and the State agree that Kerr trespassed on cultivated private land to retrieve the elk 
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after it died, and, by doing so, committed a misdemeanor violation of LC. § 36-1603(a). Fish 
and Game cited Kerr for trespassing and, based on his trespassing, confiscated the elk. 
On February 8, 2016, Kerr filed a written guilty plea to the trespassing charge. He was 
sentenced and a judgment of conviction was entered on March 14, 2016. 
During the sentencing hearing, the magistrate determined that Fish and Game was 
entitled to retain the elk rather than release it to Kerr. The magistrate agreed, however, to wait 
thirty days before signing an order under LC. § 36-1304(b)(i) for the elk's confiscation by Fish 
and Game, giving Kerr an opportunity to seek reconsideration on that point. 
On April 11, 2016, Kerr filed what amounts to a motion to reconsider, arguing that the 
magistrate misapplied the statute. A hearing was scheduled for May 10, 2016, after which the 
magistrate took the motion under advisement. Three weeks later, on May 31, 2016, the 
magistrate issued a memorandum decision denying reconsideration. 
Kerr filed a notice of appeal on July 12, 2016. In his notice of appeal, he raised two 
issues. The first is the issue he raised before the magistrate: whether section 36-1304(b )(i) 
provides for the elk's confiscation. The second is a new issue he didn't raise before the 
magistrate: whether section 36-1304(b)(i) is unconstitutionally vague as applied here. 
About three weeks after Kerr filed his notice of appeal, the Court issued an order 
establishing the procedures to be followed on appeal, including setting the briefing schedule. As 
the order says, the Court determined that the appeal involves only a question of law, namely 
whether section 36-1304(b )(i) provides for confiscation of an elk Kerr lawfully shot while on a 
public hunting ground, but which moved before dying onto cultivated private land, upon which 
Kerr trespassed to retrieve it. This is the question presented by Kerr's first appeal issue. The 
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order also noted the Court's intention not to solicit briefing on Kerr's second appeal issue, as he 
didn't raise that issue before the magistrate. 
Kerr nevertheless argued both issues in his opening brief, failing even to acknowledge the 
Court's expressed concern that he didn't raise the void-for-vagueness issue before the magistrate 
and therefore is foreclosed from raising it on appeal. In its brief, the State asserted that Kerr 
waived his void-for-vagueness argument by not raising it before the magistrate. On reply, Kerr 
contended that he indeed had made that argument to the magistrate, citing as proof the 
magistrate's reference to his "other argument" (Memorandum Decision 5), without pointing to 
anything in the brief he submitted to the magistrate or to any statement he made in open court in 
front of the magistrate. In context, the magistrate's reference to Kerr's "other argument" gives 
no indication the magistrate perceived Kerr to have made a void-for-vagueness argument. 
(Memorandum Decision 5.) Kerr simply did not make any such argument. 
Oral argument was held on December 19, 2016, at which point the Court took the matter 
under advisement, telling the parties its decision would be issued right away. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Fish and Game may confiscate any wildlife "taken unlawfully." I.C. § 36-1304(b)(i). In 
this context, "take" means, among other things, "hunt, pursue, ... shoot, ... kill, or possess or 
any attempt to do so." LC. § 36-202(i) (emphasis added).1 "The word 'or' is disjunctive, 
meaning that it is a conjunction used to introduce an alternative." State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 
1 Section 36-202's prefatory language says its definitions apply whenever the defined terms are 
used in Title 36 of the Idaho Code, and it says "[t]he present tense includes the past and future 
tenses, and the future, the present." J.C.§ 36-202. Thus, the meaning of the word "taken," as 
used in section 36-1304(b )(i), is set by section 36-202(i)' s definition of the word ''take." 
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722,726,339 P.3d 1126, 1130 (2014). It follows that Fish and Game may confiscate an elk 
from a hunter who unlawfully hunted it, unlawfully pursued it, unlawfully shot it, unlawfully 
killed it, or unlawfully possessed it, or who unlawfully attempted to do any of those things. The 
hunter might have done one or more of those things lawfully, but doing any one of them 
unlawfully subjects him to confiscation of his kill. By his own admission, Kerr acted unlawfully 
in gaining possession of the elk he shot. That is the bottom-line reason the magistrate's decision 
was correct and Kerr's appeal fails. 
Although the case is straightforward enough that the Court could end its analysis there, 
the Court will proceed to address Kerr's arguments in detail. Kerr contends he shot the elk 
lawfully because he had the necessary hunting tag and he and the elk were located on a public 
hunting ground when he shot it. The magistrate made no finding as to whether Kerr in fact shot 
the elk on public land. Instead, the magistrate effectively took that as a given, despite the 
parties' dispute on the point. It didn't matter whether Kerr shot the elk lawfully, the magistrate 
concluded, because after shooting it he proceeded to possess it unlawfully, admittedly 
trespassing on cultivated private land in violation of LC. § 36-1603(a) to gain possession.2 
The magistrate's view is indisputably correct as a matter of statutory interpretation 
because it gives effect to the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the statute's words. See, e.g., 
Wright v. Ada Cty., 160 Idaho 491,497,376 P.3d 58, 64 (2016). Kerr may have shot the elk 
lawfully, but he violated the la\V against trespassing on cultivated private land in order to gain 
possession of it after shooting it. Thus, even assuming he shot the elk lawfully, he unlawfully 
possessed it, triggering Fish and Game's confiscation right under section 36-l 304(b)(i). 
2 The word "possession" is defined fi.)r this purpose in LC. § 36-202(m). Kerr doesn't argue that 
he neither gained nor attempted to gain possession of the elk according to that definition. 
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Moreover, according to his own version of events-in which he lawfully shot the elk on public 
land and trespassed on cultivated private land to retrieve it-he unlawfully pursued the dying elk 
because he pursued it after shooting it by trespassing on cultivated private land, triggering that 
same confiscation right in a second way. 
Kerr's arguments to the contrary are not well taken. His principal argument is that, by 
shooting the elk lawfully, he "took" it lawfully, and because the same elk logically can't be 
"taken" twice, the elk he shot wasn't "taken" again when he unlawfully gained possession of it 
by trespassing on cultivated private land to retrieve it. The fundamental problem with this 
argument is that nothing in the statute suggests an elk can only be ''taken" once. 
As already noted, "take" is a statutorily defined term. Its meaning is very broad and isn't 
synonymous with "kill" (though that is one way to "take" an elk). I.C. § 36-202(i). Of course an 
elk can't be killed more than once. But, given the statutory definition of"take," the same elk can 
be "taken" multiple times. Indeed, Kerr first "took" the elk by "hunting" it, even before he shot 
it. See LC. § 36-202(i) (providing that to "hunt" is to ''take"); LC. § 36-202(i) (defining 
"hunting" essentially as trying to capture or kill wildlife, whether successfully or not). He may 
well have ''taken" the elk a second time by "pursuing" it (if it happened to have been necessary 
for him to pursue the elk after seeing it but before shooting it). Then he ''took" it another time by 
"shooting" it, perhaps another time by "killing" it (if shooting it alone weren't enough to cause 
its death), and still another time by "pursuing" the dying elk onto cultivated private land. 
Finally, he ''took" the elk by "possessing" it. 
Kerr's principal argument-that one act qualifying as "taking" the elk bars any 
subsequent act from also qualifying as ''taking" the elk-is without statutory grounding. And 
applying his logic to the confiscation statute would yield the absurd result that one who lawfully 
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"hunts" an elk-and thus under section 36-202(i) "takes" the elk before having shot, killed, or 
possessed it-is free of the risk of confiscation, no matter how he many fish-and-game laws he 
violates in ultimately shooting, killing, or possessing it. The magistrate's correct interpretation, 
by contrast, sensibly places a hunter at risk of confiscation unless every act that qualifies as 
"taking" the animal at issue is a lawful one. 
Kerr also argues that the confiscation statute has no application when the hunter's only 
unlawful behavior is violating the statute he violated, section 36-1603(a). This argument fails 
because nothing in the confiscation statute, or elsewhere in the fish-and-game statutory scheme, 
suggests any such limitation on the scope of the confiscation statute. The confiscation statute 
applies by its own terms whenever wildlife is unlawfully taken. LC.§ 36-1304(b)(i). It doesn't 
list any particular fish-and-game statute or statutes that must be violated for it to apply, 
indicating that it was intended-just as it says-to apply whenever the animal to be confiscated 
was "taken" through unlawful conduct. The magistrate did not err by declining to read a 
limitation into the confiscation statute that simply isn't there. Moreover, the statute Kerr 
violated, which he mischaracterizes as a mere trespass-to-retrieve statute, proscribes not only 
trespassing on private land to retrieve wildlife, but also trespassing on private land to hunt 
wildlife. LC.§ 36-1603(a). By his logic, a hunter who trespasses on private land to kill an elk 
hasn't subjected himself to confiscation of his kill because he merely violated the trespassing 
statute. That result is as unsound logically as it is lacking in statutory support. 
For these reasons, the magistrate didn't misapply the confiscation statute. 
But that isn't the end of the inquiry, as Kerr has argued that the confiscation statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Although he now says otherwise, he simply didn't 
raise that argument in front of the magistrate. "[I]ssues not raised below generally may not be 
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considered for the first time on appeal." State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906,912,265 P.3d 519,525 
(Ct. App. 2011 ). Thus, unless it was "fundamental error" for the magistrate not to find the 
confiscation statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to Kerr, despite Kerr's failure to so 
argue, this alleged error is unreviewable. See id. at 913,265 P.3d at 526. Moreover, even on 
appeal, Kerr waited until filing his reply brief to begin arguing that this alleged error is 
"fundamental error." That is too late, as issues first raised in the appellant's reply brief will not 
be considered. E.g., Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604,612,364 P.3d 951,959 (2015). Thus, 
Kerr faces two procedural bars, one for waiting until appeal to raise his void-for-vagueness 
argument and the other for waiting until his reply brief on appeal to characterize as "fundamental 
error" the magistrate's failure to sua sponte find the confiscation statute unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to him. 
There is no good reason Kerr should be permitted to avoid the effect of the latter of those 
two procedural bars. In its order establishing the procedures for this appeal, the Court expressly 
noted Kerr's failure to raise his void-for-vagueness argument before the magistrate and his 
consequent inability to assert that issue on appeal. Thus, Kerr was on notice before the briefing 
schedule began that the Court regarded the void-for-vagueness issue as untimely. Ifhe wished to 
pursue that issue anyway, he should've argued in his opening brief that the "fundamental error" 
doctrine permits him to do so. His failure to make that argument at the appropriate time 
prevented the State from briefing whether the alleged error is reviewable as "fundamental error." 
The latter procedural bar therefore thus eliminates the need to address whether Kerr can avoid 
the effect of the former procedural bar by characterizing the alleged error as "fundamental error." 
Regardless, if the Court nevertheless addresses on the merits Kerr's assertion that he is 
the victim of "fundamental error" by the magistrate, the Court finds that assertion incorrect. An 
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error is "fundamental error" if it: "(1) [it] violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. Pentico, 151 Idaho at 913, 265 P .3d at 526. Beginning with 
the first element, the constitutional right at issue is the due-process right not to be held to account 
under an unconstitutionally vague statute. That right was waived when Kerr failed to argue 
before the magistrate that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Cf State v. 
Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 503, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001) ("We are not persuaded that it 
amounts to fundamental error to allow a defendant to waive a challenge that a statute is 
overbroad as applied."). Thus, the constitutional right at issue isn't "unwaived." Regardless, 
moving to the second element, Kerr hasn't shown any error at all, much less a clear or obvious 
one. The confiscation statute's proper application to this case is perfectly clear: unlawfully 
taken wildlife may be confiscated by Fish and Game, and wildlife is unlawfully taken if the 
hunter pursues it or gains possession of it unlawfully, such as by trespassing on cultivated private 
land to retrieve it. 
The magistrate correctly decided the elk was taken unlawfully and therefore subject to 
confiscation under section 36-1304(b)(i). Accordingly, that decision is affirmed. 
t\-) 
Dated this~ day ofDecember, 2016. 
J~JJ..~ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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